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ABSTRACT  
  
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNCERTAINTY, POLICY COORDINATION AND RELOCATION DECISIONS 
We analyse the relocation decision of a firm who is producing in one country (home country) 
but has the opportunity to relocate. The firm is faced with uncertain environmental policy 
formation both at home as well as in the foreign country. We allow for international 
environmental policy coordination and for environmental policy risks to be correlated with 
economy-wide risk. We show that the impact of uncertainty on the relocation decision depends 
on the absolute level of uncertainty. However, this relationship is substantially affected by the 
existence of policy coordination and the correlation between environmental policy uncertainty 
and economy-wide risks. In the case of coordinated environmental policies for instance, an U-
shaped relation between uncertainty and relocation emerges.  
KEYWORDS:  
Location decision, policy uncertainty, environmental policy coordination, option value 
JEL:   
F18; Q28; D21 
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1. Introduction 
The impact of environmental compliance costs on foreign direct investment and the 
location decision of firms has been analysed in both theoretical and empirical economic 
literature. The issue has also been the subject of some debate among environmentalists, 
industry representatives, free trade advocates and other governmental and non-governmental 
organisations ([2], [16], [7], [18]).  
We model the relocation decision as a choice between production in the home country and 
production in the foreign country. As in Motta and Thisse [10] our firm is located in the 
home country and faces a sunk relocation cost. Following Xepapadeas [21] we introduce 
uncertainty and assume that the changes in environmental policy stringency are uncertain. 
However, we do not restrict uncertainty to the home country. We explicitly take into account 
uncertainty abroad. Furthermore, we introduce a measure of explicit or implicit policy 
coordination. Thirdly, we allow for environmental policy risks to be correlated with economy-
wide risks. We do not allow regulatory competition as we focus on the location decision of 
the firm. All variables used in the model are assumed to be known to or, with respect to 
uncertainty for instance, perceived by the firm.  
This paper adds to the existing theoretical literature by revealing that environmental 
policy coordination and the correlation between environmental and economy-wide risks play 
a crucial role in the relocation behaviour of firms. Furthermore, environmental policy 
uncertainty abroad should be taken into account as well. Our model suggests that the 
empirical results may suffer from a missing variable bias related to the uncertainties with 
respect to environmental policy stringency, the international policy coordination and the way 
in which environmental policy risks correlate with economy-wide risk. The fact that panel 
data techniques seem to produce more evidence in favour of relocation due to environmental 
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reasons suggests that some effects that are caught by the panel’s country specific effects play 
an important role as control variable. This paper argues that uncertainty could be one of 
those effects that are caught by panel estimates but are lost in single time series or cross-
section estimates. However, environmental policy uncertainty in one country is not sufficient. 
Our model clearly reveals a role for uncertainty in the foreign country and international 
policy coordination. Most empirical work has neglected these variables.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the second paragraph of this paper 
reviews some of the relevant literature. The next paragraph presents the model. The fourth 
discusses the most important model results. The final section concludes. 
 
 
 
2. Some relevant literature 
Theoretical literature that deals with localisation decisions includes, among others, Motta 
and Thisse [10], Markusen [9], Ulph [17], Ulph and Valentini [19], Petrakis and Xepapadeas 
[12] and Xepapadeas [21]. Only the latter includes uncertainty with respect to policy 
stringency explicitly in his model.  
Motta and Thisse [10] assume a two-country economy with two firms producing a 
homogeneous good and each of them located in one of the countries. They analyse the impact 
of a change in environmental policy in one of the two countries on the location decision of 
local firms. They assume location independent variable production costs and fixed relocation 
costs. In their model, relocation depends on the size of the market. If markets are small, 
relocation is never profitable and a more stringent environmental policy will stop the local 
producer from exporting to the other country. As market size increases however, relocation 
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becomes a possibility. If markets are sufficiently large, partial relocation might even be 
considered in the absence of environmental policy. 
 Markusen [9] models the location decision by imperfectly competitive firms in the 
presence of trade barriers when confronted with environmental regulation. He shows that 
intra-firm reallocations within multinational firms are less sensitive to increased marginal 
costs compared to national firms. His analysis also points to the fact that the nature of the 
cost increases due to environmental policy plays a role in location decisions. Regulations, 
which have an impact on fixed costs, can be absorbed through the exit of some firms, 
whereas a change in the marginal cost is absorbed through changes in production.  
Ulph and Valentini [19] use a two-country framework with one upstream and one 
downstream industry and two firms in each industry. Economic geography suggests that both 
industries might find it advantageous to be located close to one another. Firms face constant 
marginal costs but have to incur a fixed cost if they wish to relocate to another country. 
They show that there might be some ‘hysteresis effects’. In the absence of environmental 
policy, all production, both in the up- and downstream industries, is located in the low cost 
country. If this country increases environmental taxes, firms will not change their location at 
first. At some level of environmental taxes however, two equilibriums emerge but firms do 
not relocate. If environmental taxes increase further, firms relocate. If the low cost country 
decides to lower taxes, it will have to do so in a significant way as the model moves from one 
equilibrium in the high cost country to two equilibriums without any relocation. The model 
only reaches the original equilibrium with all production in the original country if 
environmental costs are further reduced.  
None of these papers include environmental policy uncertainty. Petrakis and Xepapadeas 
[12] analyse the relocation decision of a monopolist depending on whether the government 
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can commit herself to an emission tax before the relocation decision is taken or not. They 
show that if the government can do so, relocation is less likely. Commitment can be seen as a 
way to reduce environmental policy uncertainty in the home country. Xepapadeas [21] 
focuses on 1 firm and introduces environmental policy uncertainty in the home country. He 
shows that at any time there is a threshold level where, if the environmental policy 
parameter exceeds this level, relocation will be immediate. As long as the environmental 
policy parameter does not exceed the threshold level, firms will not relocate. Both these 
papers include environmental policy uncertainty but do so only from the perspective of the 
home country.  
Concluding, theoretical literature suggests that relocation is possible and has identified 
various channels through which environmental policy affects relocation decisions. Although 
there is some support for environmental factors to have an effect on the location decision, 
Jeppesen and Folmer [4] argue that the impacts of environmental policy on location 
behaviour are insignificant or negligible. Sleuwaegen et al. [15] questioned companies on their 
motive to relocate. Their results suggest that environmental compliance costs are not an issue 
as none of their respondents mentioned them as an important reason for relocation. List et al. 
[6] analyse the relocation behaviour of plants in 62 counties in New York State from 1980 to 
1990. They investigate whether the ‘in-attainment” (IA) or ‘out-of-attainment’ (OA) 
designation under the US 1997 Clean Air Act Amendments had an impact on the relocation 
behaviour of plants. Firms moving into an OA area are subject to an environmental standard 
that requires them to use equipment that achieves the ‘Lowest Achievable Emissions Rate’ 
irrespective of the costs. Firms moving into IA counties on the other hand are subject to less 
stringent environmental standards. Their evidence clearly suggests that more stringent 
environmental regulations play a critical role in the location decision of relocating plants.  
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The empirical literature further suggests that the choice of the methodology might have an 
impact on the result. Jeppesen, List and Folmer [5] for instance argue that the type of model 
and estimation technique used to estimate new plant location decisions has an impact on the 
estimate of the effect of environmental stringency. Their evidence suggests that panel data 
estimates for instance yield larger evidence in support of the pollution haven hypothesis. List 
et al. [6] report that controlling for county-specific unobservables raises the costs of being an 
OA county. They argue that in their case, this might be due to the fact that counties that 
are or anticipate of becoming an OA introduce subsidies to compensate plants for additional 
costs.   
 
 
 
3. The model 
3.1. Basic set-up of the model 
Following Xepapadeas [21] we focus on the behaviour of a small, risk-neutral firm within 
an industry with n identical firms. Our representative firm is producing at home (h) but has 
the possibility to relocate to a foreign (f) country to serve the competitive world market from 
that location. All variables will be denoted with a subscript h if they refer to variables 
assuming production at home and a subscript f to denote variables assuming production in 
the foreign country. A subscript i will be used if the location is not specified. The firm’s 
production function is location independent and is of the form  
 i iq Ze
ϕ=  (1) 
with iq  the level of production, ie  the environmental input, ]0,1[ϕ ∈  the elasticity of 
production with respect to the environmental input and Z  a technology factor. 
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Notwithstanding the location-independent production technology, output may vary across 
countries due to differences in the level of environmental inputs. This is in line with Motta 
and Thisse [10] who assume location independent variable production costs. Furthermore 
equality with respect to production technologies allows us to focus on the role of the 
uncertainty with respect to future levels of environmental policy stringency and its effect on 
location decisions.   
The firm receives a fixed exogenous world market price p  per unit of production sold. 
Transport costs are assumed zero and environmental inputs are taxed at a rate iτ . 
Environmental taxes should be interpreted broadly as each environmental policy instrument 
can be converted into a tax equivalent. Furthermore, the variable iτ  captures all costs 
associated with all environmental inputs and could be seen as a measure of environmental 
stringency. Throughout this paper we will assume that 0iτ >  and that the tax rate is not 
prohibitive. This assumption with respect to environmental policy stringency is in line with 
data for most sectors. Low [8], for instance, lists pollution abatement operating costs in 1988 
USD as a percentage of industry output for various SIC 3-digit industries and finds that the 
3 highest ratio’s equal 3,17% in the cement and hydraulic industry, 2,42% in the pulp mills 
industry and 2,39% in the wood buildings/mobile homes industry while the 3 lowest ratio’s 
equal 0,01% (miscellaneous industries), 0,02% (search/navigation equipment and periodicals) 
and 0,04% (office & computing machines). Even for the lowest of the ratio’s, total pollution 
abatement costs equalled 1988 USD 1,1 million.  
We will assume that we can model the firm’s perception of environmental policy 
stringency levels in both countries as correlated geometric Brownian motions 
 h h h h h hd dt dz ττ α τ σ τ= +  (2) 
 f f f f f fd dt dz ττ α τ σ τ= +  (3) 
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with i iα τ  the instantaneous drift rate, ( )2i iσ τ  the instantaneous variance rate and 
i idz dtτ τξ=  the increment of a Wiener process with E[ ]f h fhdz dz dtτ τ ρ= , ( )0,1
iid
i
τξ →  and 
fhρ  the correlation coefficient. 
From (2) and (3), it can be seen that the firm expects that environmental taxes will 
change over time at a rate of iα  in country i. However, it is unable to predict future 
stringency levels with certainty. The firm does not have perfect foresight with respect to, for 
instance, the exact timing of new environmental policy legislation, the instruments that will 
be used, the environmental inputs that will be targeted or the way in or the intensity of 
monitoring compliance. The instantaneous variance rate reflects the level of uncertainty 
surrounding future environmental policy stringency.  
If we assume for instance that initial taxes are such that h fτ τ> , (2) and (3) imply that 
this does not need to be the case forever. Indeed, if h fα α<  environmental taxes in f are 
expected to catch up with those in h at some future date. Should  h fα α>  the gap between 
emission taxes in f and h is expected to widen. The correlation coefficient Efh f hτ τρ ξ ξ =     can 
be seen as a measure perceived implicit or explicit policy coordination as it points to a shared 
component in the Wiener processes associated with the change in environmental policy 
stringency. If the firm believes that environmental policy is somehow coordinated, 
0 1fhρ< ≤ . We will refer to this case as coordinated environmental policies. On the other 
hand, if it believes that environmental policies are uncoordinated, it will assume that 
1 0fhρ− ≤ ≤ . We will refer to this case as uncoordinated policies.  
The optimum profit function equals ([20]) 
 ( )
1
1 11 1, , ,i i iZ p pZ
ϕ
ϕ ϕϕπ τ ϕ τϕ ϕ
− − −    =        (4). 
From (4) it follows that 
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( ), , ,
0
i i
i
Z pπ τ ϕ
τ
∂
<∂  (5) 
 
( )2
2
, , ,
0
i i
i
Z pπ τ ϕ
τ
∂
>∂  (6) 
By Ito’s lemma ([11]) and noting that 
1
i
i i
i
π ϕτ πτ ϕ
∂ =∂ −  with 1
ϕ
ϕ −  the elasticity of the 
profit function with respect to a change in taxes and that 
( )
2
2
2 21
i
i
i
π ϕττ ϕ
∂ =∂ −  with 
1 0
1ϕ <−  the elasticity of the first derivative of the profit function with respect to the tax, 
it follows that 
 i i i i i id dt dz ππ θ π γ π= +  (7) 
with 
21
1 2 1
i
i i
ϕ σθ αϕ ϕ
 = +  − −  , 1i i
ϕγ σ ϕ= − , i idz dt
π πζ= , i iπ τζ ξ= − , 
E 1i idz dz dtτ π  = −    and E f h fhdz dz dtπ π ρ  =   . Equation (7) implies that the profits from 
producing in i are expected to change at a rate equal to iθ . Just like future environmental 
stringency levels, profit flows are uncertain. The expected drift will be non-positive if 
( )
2
0 1
2 1
i
i i
θ σα α ϕ
=≥ = −  and will be larger in absolute value as ϕ  increases. If 
0
i i
θα α =<  it 
will be the case that 0iθ >  and its value will increase with ϕ . If 2
2
2
i
i i
αϕ σ α< +  the 
expected drift in the profit function will be smaller than the expected drift in environmental 
policy stringency. The uncertainty of future profits, will rise with ϕ  as well. Furthermore, 
i iγ σ<  for values of 1 2ϕ < .  
With respect to idz π , a positive shock in the tax rate implies a negative shock to the profit 
function due to the fact that 0
1
ϕ
ϕ <− . A positive value for i
τξ  implies a negative value for 
i
πζ  of the same magnitude, i.e. for any two realisations of the stochastic process we have that 
i i
π τζ ξ= −  as the source of the uncertainty is the same for both the tax rate and the profit 
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function. We will refer to iπζ  as environmental policy risk and write i iπ τζ ξ= −  with 
1i i
ϕγ σ ϕ= −  because it stresses the fact that positive environmental stringency shocks 
imply negative shocks for profits.  
 
3.2. The relocation decision 
When the firm relocates to f at time t it must abandon its production facilities in h. The 
value of these facilities equals  
 ( ) ( )
0
=E h h hth h t h
h h
V e dtµ θ ππ π
µ θ
∞ − −  =   −∫  (8) 
with  
 
hh s hr πµ ρ φγ= +  (9), 
 0h h hµ θ δ− = >  (10), 
E[ ]
hs h sh
ππρ ζ ζ=  the correlation between environmental risk and the Wiener process 
associated with the market portfolio in h, φ  the market price of risk, r the risk free interest 
rate and hδ  the dividend yield (i.e. the difference between the risk-adjusted expected return 
and the profit growth rate). We will assume that the dividend yield is always positive. From 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), we know that 0hµ > . It follows that if h hµ θ>  
then hδ  will be positive. This condition will always be satisfied if 0h hθα α =≥ . However, if 
0
h h
θα α =<  then we have to assume that min 0 1h h h hθ ϕα α α µϕ
=  − > = −    .  
The Wiener process associated with the market portfolio, shζ , can be seen as a measure of 
economy-wide risk in h. It follows that 
hsπρ  can be seen as a measure of the correlation 
between the economy-wide and environmental policy risk. If the firm believes that 
environmental policy stringency and the economy-wide uncertainties are positively correlated, 
it would expect a negative correlation between the market portfolio and the change in profits 
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and vice versa. We will say that economy-wide and environmental policy risks are negatively 
correlated if 1 0
hsπρ− ≤ ≤  and positively correlated if 0 1hsπρ< ≤ . 
In deciding whether to relocate or not, the firm has to compare its net present value when 
it produces in h with its value when it produces in f. The expected value at time t of the 
discounted profits in f equals  
 ( ) ( )
0
=E f f ftf f t f
f f
V e dtµ θ
ππ π
µ θ
∞ − −  =   −∫  (11) 
with  
 
ff s fr πµ ρ φγ= +  (12) 
 0f f fµ θ δ− = >  (13) 
with E[ ]
fs h sf
ππρ ζ ζ=  and sfζ  a measure of economy-wide risk in f. We can write 
f f fµ θ δ− =  as the opportunity cost of delaying relocation in fπ . If the firm were to 
relocate now, it would expect a return equal to fµ . If the firm does not relocate, the expected 
profits change at a rate equal to fθ . The difference between these two rates equals the return 
that the firm did not earn because it decided not to relocate. Again in order for 0fδ >  we 
have to assume that min 0 1f f f fθ
ϕα α α µϕ
=  − > = −    . 
If the firm relocates at time t, it will incur sunk costs. First of all, the firm needs to 
physically relocate or sell its production facilities in h to finance the investment in f. Physical 
relocation will involve costs associated with the transport and re-building of the production 
facilities in f, costs associated with the in-activity of the facilities, … . Selling production 
facilities involves sunk costs as well. From the real options literature1 it is well known that 
the value of the investment should exceed the irreversible investment costs. As Pindyck [13] 
argues, most firm or industry specific investments are irreversible. He further argues that 
                                     
1 for a review: [13], [1] and [14] 
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even investments that are not specific to a firm or an industry are partly irreversible. So if 
the firm sells its facilities in h as opposed to physical relocation, the investor buying them 
will require a discount on their value, even if these assets are not firm or industry specific. 
This discount can be seen as a measure of the firm or industry specificity of the assets the 
firm sells in h. Therefore a firm cannot expect to receive the full amount of the expected 
discounted value of its profits (equation (8)).  
Secondly, if the investment in f turns out to be a ‘bad’ one, physical relocation back to h 
or the sale of production facilities in f and re-investing the proceeds in h will again involve 
irreversible costs. In order to keep our model simple, we will assume that sunk costs of 
physical relocation are the same as the sunk costs of the sale of assets in h and we will 
assume that they are equal to a fixed multiple m of the value of the firm in h. It follows that 
the sunk costs of relocation, R, equals   
 h
h
R m πδ=  (14) 
with 0m > . From the definition of m, it follows that it will be higher if the firm or industry 
specificity of the assets held by the firm is large. If the firm incurs the sunk cost R it will 
receive assets in f worth ( )f fV π . From (14), it can be seen that R depends on hπ . Due to 
the linearity of the dependency however, R will follow a geometric Brownian motion with the 
same instantaneous drift and variance as hπ , i.e.  
 h h hdR Rdt Rdz πθ γ= +  (15). 
From the real options literature, it is well known that an option to postpone an 
investment involving sunk costs and uncertainty has value (Dixit and Pindyck [1]). Any 
relocation should thus compensate the investor both for the sunk costs and for ‘giving up’ the 
value of the option to postpone relocation. As shown in appendix 1, relocation requires that 
the profits from production in f are at least equal to a threshold level *fπ : 
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 1*
1 1
f H
βπ β
 =   −  (16) 
with f h
h
mH δ πδ= . If the profit from producing in f exceeds the threshold level 
*
fπ  relocation 
will be immediate. As long as *f fπ π<  the firm will keep production in h. From (4) it follows 
that it is not sufficient that f hτ τ< . The firm requires that the difference in environmental 
policy stringency is large enough so as to make sure that the profit in f compensates both the 
sunk costs as well as the value of the relocation option.  
 
3.3. Model results 
With respect to the sunk relocation costs R, (16) confirms a well-known result from the 
real option literature: the relocation threshold level of profits in f, *fπ , increases with m and 
hπ . Using (5) and (6) it can be seen that with f hτ τ< , an increase in hτ  and fτ  of equal 
magnitude increases the difference between the threshold level *fπ  and the actual profits fπ . 
Indeed, the impact of an increase in environmental policy stringency on profits in h will be 
smaller than the impact of the same increase on profits in f. 
With respect to hσ  and fσ , (16) suggests three channels through which they affect the 
relocation decision. This is the case because we cannot assume that the opportunity cost of 
delaying relocation is constant. Indeed, if the uncertainty changes, so does the risk-adjusted 
expected return. As all other variables affecting iδ  are fixed with respect to uncertainty, it 
has to adjust to preserve equilibrium (Dixit and Pindyck [1]). The first derivative of *fπ  with 
respect to iσ ,  
 
* * * *
1 1
1 1
f f f fi i
i i i i i i
π π π πβ β δ δ
σ β σ β δ σ δ σ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  (17) 
shows that two channels pass through the options component ( 1
1 1
β
β − ) while the other passes 
through passes through iδ . 
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As far as the first channel, 
*
1
1
f
i
π β
β σ
∂ ∂
∂ ∂ , is concerned, (16) shows that the higher the values of 
1
1 1
β
β − , the higher 
*
fπ  should be before the firm proceeds to relocation.  With respect to the 
impact of uncertainty on 1β  the following proposition holds: 
PROPOSITION 1: For a given level of iδ , an increase in iσ  lowers the value of 1β  if 
environmental policies are not coordinated or if i j fhσ σ ρ>  with coordinated environmental 
policies while it increases the value of 1β  if i j fhσ σ ρ<  with coordinated environmental 
policies. Furthermore, with coordinated environmental policies, it holds that if 1 0
i
β
σ
∂ >∂  then 
1 0
j
β
σ
∂ <∂ . An increase in iσ  will not change the value of 1β  if 0 1
i
ij
j
σ ρσ< = ≤ .  
PROOF: see annex 2. 
It is well known from the option literature that uncertainty increases the value of an 
option ([3]). The option to relocate has two sources of uncertainty: the uncertainty associated 
with hdπ  and fdπ . If these flows are negatively correlated, then an increase in the 
uncertainty associated with one of these profit flows increases the overall uncertainty, which 
increases the value of the option to postpone relocation. If, on the other hand the two sources 
of uncertainty are correlated, the total variance of the portfolio will decrease if the smaller of 
the two uncertainties increases. This is due to the fact that the negative correlation effect on 
the covariance ( 2 f fhγ ρ−  ) outweighs the positive impact on the variance (2 hγ ) and hence, 
the total variance decreases.  
Proposition 1 emphasizes the importance to take policy coordination into account. The 
level of perceived policy coordination has a profound impact on the way in which higher 
levels of uncertainty affect the options component of the optimal relocation rule. Indeed, if 
uncertainty in the home country is small relative to the foreign country and the firm believes 
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that policy is coordinated, higher levels of uncertainty at home will reduce the threshold level 
of profits required in the foreign country before relocation is considered. If on the other hand 
relative levels of uncertainty in the foreign country are small relative to the level at home, 
higher levels of uncertainty will increase the threshold level of profits in the foreign country. 
With respect to the second channel, 
*
1
1
f i
i i
π β δ
β δ σ
∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ , the following proposition holds:  
PROPOSITION 2: If economy-wide and environmental policy risks in i are negatively 
correlated or if ( )1
ii sπσ φρ ϕ> −  when they are positively correlated in i, then an increase 
in iσ  will increase 1β  through its influence on iδ  if i=h and reduce the value of 1β  through 
its influence on iδ  if i=f. If ( )0 1ii sπσ φρ ϕ< < −  when economy-wide and environmental 
policy risks are positively correlated in i, an increase in iσ  will reduce 1β  through its 
influence on iδ  if i=h and will increase 1β  if i=f. If ( )1ii sπσ φρ ϕ= −  then a change in iσ  
will not influence 1β . 
PROOF: see annex 3. 
The opportunity cost of the relocation project equals fδ . If an increase in uncertainty 
reduces the opportunity cost of the relocation project, it reduces the opportunity cost of 
holding on to the option to relocate. This increases the option’s value. If, on the other hand 
the opportunity cost rises, so does the cost of keeping the option, which reduces its value. 
With respect to hδ  the opposite happens. If an increase in uncertainty has a positive effect on 
the dividend yield hδ , the opportunity cost of not holding on to production in h increases. 
This increases the value of this option.  
PROPOSITION 3: If economy-wide and environmental policy risks in i are negatively 
correlated or if ( )1
ii sπσ φρ ϕ> −  when they are positively correlated in i, then an increase 
in iσ will increase *fπ  for a given level of 1β  if i=h and will reduce *fπ  for a given level of 1β  
if i=f. If ( )0 1
ii sπσ φρ ϕ< < −  when economy-wide and environmental policy risks in i are 
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positively correlated, an increase in iσ will reduce *fπ  for a given level of 1β  if i=h and will 
increase *fπ  for a given level of 1β  if i=f. If ( )1ii sπσ φρ ϕ= −  with 0 1isπρ< ≤  then a 
change in iσ  will not influence *fπ  for a given level of 1β . 
PROOF: From 1* 2
1
0
1
h
f h f
h
mβ ππ δ δβ δ∂ ∂ = − <− , 
1*
1
0
1
h
f f
h
mβ ππ δ β δ∂ ∂ = >−  and i iδ σ∂ ∂  
proposition 3 follows.  
 
If an increase in uncertainty reduces the opportunity cost of the relocation project in f, it 
can be seen from (11) that this increases the value of the relocation project. It follows that 
relocation will occur at lower levels of profits in f. If an increase in uncertainty reduces the 
dividend yield in h, it increases the value of the firm in h. It follows that higher profits are 
needed in f before relocation is considered.  
Propositions 2 and 3 emphasize the importance to take the perceived correlation between 
economy-wide and environmental policy risk into account. Indeed, if both risks are positively 
correlated, then an increase in environmental policy uncertainty has a negative effect on iδ . 
However, in the opposite case when these risks are negatively correlated, higher uncertainty 
will have a positive effect on iδ  if uncertainty is low to modest while it will have a negative 
impact if uncertainty is high.  
 
4. Discussion 
Proposition 1 to 3 show that the various channels through which environmental policy 
uncertainty influences the relocation decision do not share the same sign. In order to 
investigate the overall impact of environmental policy uncertainty, policy coordination and 
correlation between economy-wide and environmental policy risk, we performed a number of 
simulations. Results are reported in table 1. The simulations are designed to analyse the 
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behaviour of *fπ  as well as *f hπ σ∂ ∂ for hσ  equal to 0.05, 0.15 and 0.25, fhρ  equal to –0.75 
(reported in panel A) and 0.75 (panel B), for 
fsπρ  equal to –0.75 (panels A1 and B1) and 
0.75 (panels A2 and B2) and 
hsπρ  equal to –0.75, 0 and +0.75. To calculate the slope, 
*
f hπ σ∂ ∂ , we measured the difference between *fπ  for hσ +0.01 and *fπ  for hσ  given all other 
variables. Table 2 reports the results of comparable simulations that were performed to 
measure the impact of changes in fσ  on *fπ  and *f fπ σ∂ ∂ . 
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
Tables 1 and 2 clearly show that both the correlation between economy-wide and 
environmental policy risk as well as environmental policy coordination matters in assessing 
the impact of uncertainty on the relocation threshold level of profits in f. Comparing the level 
of *fπ  with 0.75fhρ = −  (panel A) and 0.75fhρ =  (panel B) reveals that the former results 
in level of *fπ  that are always higher then those reported for the latter. This is due to the 
fact that higher levels of environmental policy coordination reduce the overall level of 
uncertainty. From the first derivative of (16) with respect to fhρ , it can be seen that higher 
levels of policy coordination lower the relocation threshold level of profits in f.  
Including environmental policy coordination affects the shape of the relation between the 
relocation threshold and environmental policy uncertainty in h or f. Comparing panels A and 
B reveals that the slope is always less steep if environmental policies are coordinated 
compared to the situation where this is not the case. Furthermore, panel B shows that for 
low levels of environmental policy uncertainty the slope is actually negative if policies are 
coordinated. Notice from table 2 that these negative values for the slope are even visible at 
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higher levels of environmental uncertainty in f. This suggests that the existence of 
international environmental policy coordination results in an U-shaped relation between the 
relocation threshold level of profits in f and environmental policy uncertainty in h or f. At 
first, an increase in environmental policy uncertainty reduces the relocation threshold. 
However, at some point, higher levels of uncertainty result in an increase of *fπ . This U-
shaped relation is due to proposition 1: the sign of iβ σ∂ ∂  changes from positive (negative) 
when iσ  surpasses (falls below) j fhσ ρ .  
For coordinated environmental policies, these results are in line with those obtained by 
Petrakis and Xepapadeas [12]. These authors find that the ability to pre-commit to an 
environmental tax level reduces the relocation threat. Our model would predict the same 
outcome. If governments pre-commit to an emission tax, one can argue that this reduces the 
level of environmental policy uncertainty. In the case of coordinated environmental policies, 
this increases the level of the relocation threshold and hence, reduces the relocation threat. 
For uncoordinated environmental policies on the other hand, the ability to pre-commit offers 
the government in f a way to attract investment.  
With respect to the correlation between economy-wide and environmental policy risk, 
tables 1 and 2 show that it affects the relocation decision and the way in which uncertainty 
translates into the relocation threshold level of profits in f. Comparing panels A1 and A2 or 
B1 and B2 from table 1 reveals that, in the home country h, higher levels of 
fsπρ  are 
associated with higher levels of both *fπ  as well as *f hπ σ∂ ∂  while the opposite is true for 
hsπρ . If economy-wide and environmental policy risks in f are correlated, the firm’s profit 
flows from f will be more volatile compared to the case they are uncorrelated. This higher 
risk profile translates into higher levels of the expected return (see (12)). Although this 
increases the opportunity costs of not relocating (proposition 2), it also reduces the value of 
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the relocation project (proposition 3). The latter effect outweighs the former and hence, the 
firm requires higher profits in f before it considers relocation. If economy-wide risk and 
environmental policy in f are not correlated, negative shocks to its profit due to shocks in the 
level of environmental policy stringency will be compensated in part by positive economy-
wide shocks. This reduces the overall volatility of the firm’s profit flows from f and hence the 
attractiveness of relocation. All other things being equal, the firm will relocate at lower levels 
of profits in f. 
With respect to the correlation of economy-wide and environmental policy risks in h a 
similar line of reasoning helps to explain the results presented in the various columns in 
panels A1, A2, B1 and B2 from table 1. If these risks are uncorrelated, shocks to the profits 
due to changes in environmental policy stringency will be compensated by positive surprises 
due to economy-wide shocks. If the risks are correlated, negative shocks to the profits due to 
changes in environmental policy stringency will be enhanced by economy wide developments. 
Hence, in the case of uncorrelated risks, the predictability of future profits is better compared 
to the case of correlated risk and the firm requires a lower level of return (see (9)). Although 
this increased predictability lowers the dividend yield and hence the opportunity cost of 
relocation (proposition 2) it increases the value of the firm in h (proposition 3). It follows 
that the firm will require higher profits in f before it considers relocation if economy-wide and 
environmental policy risks in h are correlated compared to the situation where they are not. 
The various panels of table 1 reveal that the sensitivity of *fπ  for changes in hσ  is higher 
if economy-wide and environmental policy risks in f are correlated. Comparing the slope for 
different levels of 
hsπρ  shows that it is higher for uncorrelated risks in h. Higher levels of 
uncertainty increase the value of waiting. Furthermore, if economy-wide and environmental 
risks in h are uncorrelated, an increase in the level of environmental risk will reduce the 
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required return in h, which increases the value of the production facilities in h. This adds to 
the effect of the increase in risk on the opportunity to wait. If, on the other hand, risks are 
correlated, the increase in environmental policy uncertainty increases the required return. As 
this reduces the value of the production facilities in h, it lowers the effect of the increased 
uncertainty on the opportunity to wait. These results can also be verified from table 2.  
The results from this paper seem be corroborate the empirical estimates. List et al. [6] for 
instance attribute their finding that controlling for county-specific unobservables results in 
higher costs in terms of relocation of an AO-designation to the fact that AO counties might 
offer subsidies to firms to compensate them for additional environmental costs. Our model 
suggests another channel through which these subsidies have an impact on the relocation 
attractiveness of such a county. Subsidies could be seen as a way to make sure that 
environmental policy and economy-wide risks are uncorrelated. Indeed, a negative shock to 
profits due to environmental policy is (partly) compensated by financial flows from the 
government. Whether environmental policies over various countries are coordinated or not, 
the evidence presented in table 2 suggests that this lowers the relocation threshold and hence, 
increases the attractiveness for relocating firms. 
Given the desire of most governments to keep production at home, the question is: “how 
does one convince a firm to keep producing at home?”. If the firms believe that 
environmental policies are coordinated internationally, one way to convince them is to make 
sure that the policy path is very predictable and environmental policy and economy-wide 
risks are negatively correlated. This seems to favour pro-cyclical environmental policies. 
Although explicit international policy coordination is out of the realm of national decision-
making, implicit coordination is not and all other variables are within the limits of policy 
making. Implicit or explicit policy coordination offers another ‘advantage’ for h: if policies are 
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coordinated, it can be seen from table 2 (panel B) that f will have to increase environmental 
policy uncertainty in order to convince firms to relocate.  
Not all industries are affected in the same way. As was shown, the investment cost seems 
to depend on the industry or firm specificity of the assets used to produce in h. Although 
these policy conclusions are not limited in terms of this specificity, the model suggests that 
the ‘good environmental practices’ are especially relevant for those industries where firm or 
industry specificity is less an issue.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper presents a model for a firm that has an option to relocate to another country 
where environmental policies are less stringent. Future environmental policy stances in both 
countries are uncertain. The results of this paper clearly suggest that uncertainty matters. 
However, it is not so that higher levels of environmental policy uncertainty always lower the 
probability that firms relocate. The model results indicate that it is important to take into 
account environmental policy coordination, the correlation between environmental policy 
shocks and economy-wide risk as well as the level of uncertainty in one country relative to 
the level in the other country.  
The model presented in this paper suggests that regulatory competition does not need to 
be based on stringency levels. Indeed, if environmental policies are coordinated, governments 
can try to persuade firms to keep production at home through the level of environmental 
policy uncertainty and to make sure that environmental policy shocks are correlated with 
economy-wide risk.   
In terms of empirics our model points to a possible missing variable bias in the literature. 
Empirical estimates of the impact of environmental policy stringency should include measures 
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of environmental policy risk, international policy cooperation and the cyclical behaviour of 
environmental policies. To the extent that panel data methods allow capturing some of these 
variables through fixed effects, it is not surprising that panel data studies reveal more 
evidence in favour or relocation. However, even panel data methods should include at least a 
variable to control for the extent to which a country cooperates in environmental policy 
formation.  
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ANNEX 1: PROOF OF (16) 
We will follow Dixit and Pindyck [1] and use the contingent claims approach to value the 
option to relocate, ( ),fF Rπ . In order to do so, we have to assume that we can find 2 assets 
that span the risks associated with fπ  and R respectively. We will refer to these assets as πf 
and R. Let us consider a portfolio with 1 unit of the option to relocate, zf units short of πf 
and zh units short of R. The total value of this portfolio (W) equals 
 ( ),f f f hW F R z z Rπ π= − −  (18). 
By Ito’s lemma ([11]), the change in the value of this portfolio equals 
 
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
1 2
2
f f h
f
f f h f h fh f
ff
F FdWdt z d z dR
R
F F FR R dt
RR
ππ
γ π γ γ γ ρ π ππ
 ∂ ∂  = − + −    ∂ ∂ 
 ∂ ∂ ∂  + + +  ∂ ∂∂ ∂ 
 (19) 
To make this portfolio riskless, we can choose f
f
Fz π
∂= ∂  and h
Fz
R
∂= ∂ .  A riskless portfolio 
should earn the risk free rate r. From (19), the total capital gain on the portfolio equals  
 
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
1 2
2 f f h f h fh f ff
F F FR R dt
RR
γ π γ γ γ ρ π ππ
 ∂ ∂ ∂  + +  ∂ ∂∂ ∂   (20). 
However, the short position requires a payment equal to the dividend yield δi on each of the 
short positions. To hold on to the short position, a payment equal to ( )h h f f fz R z dtδ δ π+  will 
be needed in each period from t to t+dt. Subtracting these payments from the sure capital 
gain in (20) yields the guaranteed return on the portfolio W. Because this return is 
guaranteed, it equals the return on a riskless asset r.  It follows that  
 
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
1 2
2 f f h f h fh f f f hf ff
F F F F FrWdt R R R dt
R RR
γ π γ γ γ ρ π δ π δπ ππ
    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   = + + − +     ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂    
(21) 
Rearranging (21) and using (18) yields 
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[ ]
( )
2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
1 2
2
0
f f h f h fh f f f
f ff
h
F F F FR R r
RR
Fr R rF
R
γ π γ γ γ ρ π δ ππ ππ
δ
 ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + + + −  ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ 
∂+ − − =∂
 (22). 
This partial differential equation should be solved subject to the well-known value-matching 
condition (the value of production in f at the optimal relocation time minus the sunk 
relocation costs at the optimal relocation time should equal the value of the option at the 
optimal relocation time) 
 ( )
*
* * *, ff
f
F R R
ππ δ= −  (23) 
and smooth-pasting conditions:  
 
( )* *
*
,
1f
F R
R
π∂
= −∂  (24) 
 
( )* *
*
, 1f
ff
F Rπ
δπ
∂
=∂  (25). 
We’ll follow the approach used by [1] and define the ratio fw
R
π
= . From (23) it can be seen 
that the value of the option should be homogeneous of degree 1. If we multiply both fπ  and 
R  with the same constant u, it can be seen from (23) that the value of the relocation project 
as well as of the option would be multiplied by that same constant u. By setting 1u
R
=  we 
can write the value of the option as ( ) ( ), 1, ffF R RF R
ππ = . Using fw
R
π
=  the value of the 
option becomes ( )RO w . Substituting ( )RO w  in (22), expanding the derivatives, 
multiplying all terms with 1
R
 and rearranging yields  
 [ ] [ ]
2
2 2 2
2
1 2 0
2 f h f h fh h f h
d O dOw w O
dwdw
γ γ γ γ ρ δ δ δ+ − + − − =  (26). 
Solving  (26) for ( )O w  and assuming a solution ( )O w Awβ=  yields a quadratic in β : 
 ( ) 2 21 2
1 0
2 h
Q β β β δ= Γ + Γ − =  (27) 
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with  
 2 21 2h f h f fhγ γ γ γ ρΓ = + −  
 22 1
1
2
Γ = ∆ − Γ  
 h fδ δ∆ = −  
The variable 1Γ  can be interpreted as an uncertainty parameter while ∆  reflects the 
difference between the dividend yield and the opportunity cost of delaying relocations. 
Equation (27) has two roots one of which is negative while the other is positive:  
 ( )
2
1 2 2 2
1 1 1
1 1 2 1
2 2
hδβ  ∆ ∆ = − + − + >  Γ Γ Γ  (28) 
 ( )
2
2 2 2 2
1 1 1
1 1 2 0
2 2
hδβ  ∆ ∆ = − − − + <  Γ Γ Γ  (29).  
The solution to equation (26) becomes 1 21 2Aw A wβ β+ . However, because 2 0β < , 
1 2
1 2Aw A wβ β+  would approach infinity as 0w → . Because the option can have no value if 
0fπ →  we have to set A2 = 0.  
Substituting the value of the option in the value matching condition for ( )O w    
 ( )
*
* 1
f
wO w δ= −  (30) 
and the smooth-pasting conditions 
 ( )* * * 1
dOO w w
dw
− = −  (31) 
 *
1
f
dO
dw δ=  (32) 
yields  
 1
*
*
1 1
f
wAw β δ= −  (33) 
and (using (32)) 
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 1* 11 1
1
f
Aw ββ δ
− =  (34). 
Dividing (33) by (34) and rearranging yields the optimal value of w 
 1*
1 1
fw
β δβ
 =   −  (35). 
From (35) it follows that the firm will relocate if *w w≥  and keep producing in h for values 
of *w w< . Using the definition of w the firm will relocate if  
 ( )* 1
1 1
f f
fR R
π π β δβ
 ≥ =   −  (36). 
 
ANNEX 2: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 
Totally differentiate (27) with respect to 1Γ   
 
( ) ( ) 1
1 1 1
0Q Qβ β ββ
∂ ∂ ∂+ =∂Γ ∂ ∂Γ  (37). 
Because both 
( )
1
Q β
β
∂
∂  and 
( )
1
Q β∂
∂Γ  are positive at 1β  it follows that 
1
1
0β∂ <∂Γ . With respect 
to 1Γ  we know that  
 
( )1
1 1
h f fh
h
σ σ ρ ϕ
γ ϕ
−∂Γ =∂ Γ −  (38) 
 
( )1
1 1
f h fh
f
σ σ ρ ϕ
γ ϕ
−∂Γ =∂ Γ −  (39). 
From the definition of iγ , it can be seen that 01
i
i
γ ϕ
σ ϕ
∂ = >∂ − .  
If 1 0fhρ− ≤ ≤  then it holds that 1 0
iγ
∂Γ >∂  and 
1 0
i
β
σ
∂ <∂ . 
If 0 1fhρ< ≤  then it will hold that 1 0
iγ
∂Γ <∂  if i fh jσ ρ σ< . Let us assume that 
0i j ijσ σ ρ− < . It follows that i jσ σ<  so it must be that 0j i ijσ σ ρ− >  and that 
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1 1
i jγ γ
∂Γ ∂Γ= −∂ ∂  with 
1 0
iγ
∂Γ >∂  if i jσ σ>  and 
1 0
iγ
∂Γ <∂  if i jσ σ< . If i jσ σ>  then it 
immediately follows that 1 0
i
β
σ
∂ <∂ , if, on the other hand i jσ σ<  we can see that 
1 0
i
β
σ
∂ >∂ . 
If 0 1i ij
j
σ ρσ< = ≤  then it follows that 
1 0
i
β
σ
∂ =∂ . 
 
ANNEX 3: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 
Totally differentiate (27) with respect to iδ  
 
( ) ( ) ( )1
1
0
i i i
Q Q Qβ β β β
β δ δ δ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∆ ∂+ + =∂ ∂ ∂∆ ∂ ∂  (40). 
Because 0
f
Qβ
δ
∂
=∂  and 1h
Qβ
δ
∂
= −∂  it follows that 
 1 1 0
f Qβ
β β
δ
∂ = >′∂  (41) 
 1 11 0
h Qβ
β β
δ
∂ −= <′∂  (42) 
with ( ) 1Q Qβ β β′ = ∂ ∂ . 
From (10) and (13) it can be seen that  
 
( )21 1i
i
s i
i
π
δ ϕ ϕφρ σσ ϕ ϕ
∂ = −∂ − −  (43). 
From (43) it follows that 0i
i
δ
σ
∂ <∂  if 0isπρ ≤  or if ( )1ii sπσ φρ ϕ> −  with 0isπρ > . In all 
other cases it will hold that 0i
i
δ
σ
∂ ≥∂ . 
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Table 1: *fπ  for various values of hσ , fhρ , fsπρ  and hsπρ 1 
 
Panel A: 
fhρ =-0.75 
A1 
fsπρ =-0.75 
A2 
fsπρ =0.75 
hsπρ  -   0.75           0         0.75    -   0.75           0         0.75    
Level of *fπ        
hσ  = 0.05  1.2165     1.2005     1.1867     1.3862     1.3483     1.3160    
hσ = 0.15  1.5307     1.4091     1.3309     1.8780     1.6453     1.4985    
hσ = 0.25  2.5825     1.8647     1.5814     3.4465     2.2778     1.8180    
Slope: *f hπ σ∂ ∂        
hσ = 0.05  0.0199     0.0150     0.0112     0.0321     0.0216     0.0139    
hσ = 0.15  0.0528     0.0303     0.0191     0.0805     0.0426     0.0244    
hσ = 0.25  0.2413     0.0739     0.0345     0.3550     0.1018     0.0440    
Panel B: 
fhρ =0.75 
B1 
fsπρ =-0.75 
B2 
fsπρ =0.75 
hsπρ  -   0.75           0         0.75    -   0.75           0         0.75    
Level of *fπ        
hσ = 0.05  1.1078     1.0994     1.0921     1.2288     1.2009     1.1781    
hσ = 0.15  1.1032     1.0748     1.0584     1.3259     1.1866     1.1201    
hσ = 0.25  1.3963     1.1680     1.1020     2.2161     1.4497     1.2096    
Slope: *f hπ σ∂ ∂        
hσ = 0.05 -0.0045    -0.0059    -0.0068    -0.0023    -0.0083    -0.0119    
hσ = 0.15  0.0071     0.0024     0.0007     0.0342     0.0096     0.0017    
hσ = 0.25  0.0929     0.0223     0.0097     0.2210     0.0545     0.0190    
1Model data: 1h mπ = = , r = 0.10, 0.30φ = , 0.5ϕ = , 0.20fσ = , 0.10hα = , 
0.05fα = . 
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Table 2: *fπ  for various values of fσ , fhρ , hsπρ  and fsπρ 2 
 
Panel A: 
fhρ =-0.75 
A1 
hsπρ =-0.75 
A2 
hsπρ =0.75 
fsπρ  -   0.75           0         0.75    -   0.75           0         0.75    
Level of *fπ        
fσ = 0.05  1.7626     1.8328     1.9063     1.2894     1.3109     1.3342    
fσ = 0.15  1.8394     2.0299     2.2450     1.3907     1.4574     1.5370    
fσ = 0.25  1.9005     2.1843     2.5271     1.4825     1.5916     1.7285    
Slope: *f fπ σ∂ ∂        
fσ = 0.05  0.0083     0.0216     0.0362     0.0103     0.0148     0.0201    
fσ = 0.15  0.0068     0.0174     0.0308     0.0097     0.0141     0.0200    
fσ = 0.25  0.0052     0.0131     0.0250     0.0085     0.0125     0.0180    
Panel B: 
fhρ =0.75 
B1 
hsπρ =-0.75 
B2 
hsπρ =0.75 
fsπρ  -   0.75           0         0.75    -   0.75           0         0.75    
Level of *fπ        
fσ = 0.05  1.5300     1.6011     1.6767     1.1575     1.1734     1.1916    
fσ = 0.15  1.2268     1.3833     1.6042     1.0743     1.0984     1.1382    
fσ = 0.25  1.1563     1.2911     1.5768     1.0781     1.1090     1.1679    
Slope: *f fπ σ∂ ∂        
fσ = 0.05 -0.0371    -0.0239    -0.0084    -0.0134    -0.0114    -0.0084    
fσ = 0.15 -0.0169    -0.0164    -0.0051    -0.0025    -0.0022    -0.0007    
fσ = 0.25  0.0006    -0.0015     0.0001     0.0028     0.0040     0.0063    
2Model data: 1h mπ = = , r = 0.10, 0.30φ = , 0.5ϕ = , 0.20hσ = , 0.10hα = , 
0.05fα = . 
 
 
   FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
   HOVENIERSBERG 24 
   9000 GENT Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61  
 Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92  
 
 
 WORKING PAPER SERIES              7 
 
 
01/119 N. GOBBIN, B. VAN AARLE, Fiscal Adjustments and Their Effects during the Transition to the EMU, October 
2001, 28 p. (published in Public Choice, 2001). 
 
01/120 A. DE VOS, D. BUYENS, R. SCHALK, Antecedents of the Psychological Contract: The Impact of Work Values and 
Exchange Orientation on Organizational Newcomers’ Psychological Contracts, November 2001, 41 p. 
 
01/121 A. VAN LANDSCHOOT, Sovereign Credit Spreads and the Composition of the Government Budget, November 
2001, 29 p. 
 
01/122 K. SCHOORS, The fate of Russia’s former state banks: Chronicle of a restructuring postponed and a crisis foretold, 
November 2001, 54 p.  (published in Europe-Asia Studies, 2003) 
 
01/123 J. ALBRECHT, D. FRANÇOIS, K. SCHOORS, A Shapley Decomposition of Carbon Emissions without Residuals, 
December 2001, 21 p.  (published in Energy Policy, 2002). 
 
01/124 T. DE LANGHE, H. OOGHE, Are Acquisitions Worthwhile? An Empirical Study of the Post-Acquisition Performance 
of Privately Held Belgian Companies Involved in Take-overs,  December 2001, 29 p. 
 
01/125 L. POZZI, Government debt, imperfect information and fiscal policy effects on private consumption. Evidence for 2 
high debt countries,  December 2001, 34 p. 
 
02/126 G. RAYP, W. MEEUSEN, Social Protection Competition in the EMU, January 2002, 20 p.  
 
02/127 S. DE MAN, P. GEMMEL, P. VLERICK, P. VAN RIJK, R. DIERCKX, Patients’ and personnel’s perceptions of 
service quality and patient satisfaction in nuclear medicine, January 2002, 21 p. 
 
02/128 T. VERBEKE, M. DE CLERCQ, Environmental Quality and Economic Growth, January 2002, 48 p.  
 
02/129 T. VERBEKE, M. DE CLERCQ, Environmental policy, policy uncertainty and relocation decisions, January 2002, 33 p.  
 
02/130 W. BRUGGEMAN, V. DECOENE, An Empirical Study of the Influence of Balanced Scorecard-Based Variable 
Remuneration on the Performance Motivation of Operating Managers, January 2002, 19 p.  
 
02/131 B. CLARYSSE, N. MORAY, A. HEIRMAN, Transferring Technology by Spinning off Ventures: Towards an 
empirically based understanding of the spin off process, January 2002, 32 p.  
 
02/132 H. OOGHE, S. BALCAEN, Are Failure Prediction Models Transferable From One Country to Another? An Empirical 
Study Using Belgian Financial Statements, February 2002, 42 p.  
 
02/133 M. VANHOUCKE, E. DEMEULEMEESTER, W. HERROELEN, Discrete Time/Cost Trade-offs in Project scheduling 
with Time-Switch Constraints? February 2002, 23 p. (published in Journal of the Operational Research Society, 
2002) 
 
02/134 C. MAYER, K. SCHOORS, Y. YAFEH, Sources of Funds and Investment Activities of Venture Capital Funds: 
Evidence from Germany, Israel, Japan and the UK?, February 2002, 31 p.  
 
02/135 K. DEWETTINCK, D. BUYENS, Employment implications of downsizing strategies and reorientation practices: an 
empirical exploration, February 2002, 22 p.  
 
02/136 M. DELOOF, M. DE MAESENEIRE, K. INGHELBRECHT, The Valuation of IPOs by Investment Banks and the 
Stock Market: Empirical Evidence, February 2002, 24 p.  
 
02/137 P. EVERAERT, W. BRUGGEMAN, Cost Targets and Time Pressure during New Product Development, March 
2002, 21 p. (published in International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 2002). 
 
02/138 D. O’NEILL, O. SWEETMAN, D. VAN DE GAER, The impact of cognitive skills on the distribution of the black-
white wage gap, March 2002, 14 p.  
 
02/139   W. DE MAESENEIRE, S. MANIGART, Initial returns: underpricing or overvaluation? Evidence from Easdaq and 
EuroNM, March 2002, 36 p. 
 
   FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
   HOVENIERSBERG 24 
   9000 GENT Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61  
 Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92  
 
 
 WORKING PAPER SERIES              8 
 
 
02/140  K. SCHOORS, Should the Central and Eastern European accession countries adopt the EURO before or after 
accession? March 2002, 29p. (published in Economics of Planning, 2002). 
 
02/141   D. VERHAEST, E. OMEY, Overeducation in the Flemish Youth Labour Market, March 2002, 39p. 
 
02/142  L. CUYVERS, M. DUMONT, G. RAYP, K. STEVENS, Wage and Employment Effects in the EU of International 
Trade with the Emerging Economies, April 2002, 24 p. (forthcoming in Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 2003). 
 
02/143 M. GEUENS, P. DE PELSMACKER, The Role of Humor in the Persuasion of Individuals Varying in Need for 
Cognition, April 2002, 19 p. (published in Advances in Consumer Research, 2002). 
 
02/144 M. VANHOUCKE, E. DEMEULEMEESTER, W. HERROELEN, Net Present Value Maximization of Projects with 
Progress Payments, April 2002, 23 p. (published in European Journal of Operational Research, 2003) 
 
02/145   E. SCHOKKAERT, D. VAN DE GAER, F. VANDENBROUCKE, Responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism and optimal 
linear income taxation, April 2002, 37p. (revised version, co-authored by R. Luttens, forthcoming in Mathematical 
Social Sciences, 2004). 
 
02/146 J. ANNAERT, J. CROMBEZ, B. SPINEL, F. VAN HOLLE, Value and size effect: Now you see it, now you don’t,        
May 2002, 31 p. 
 
02/147 N. HOUTHOOFD, A. HEENE, The quest for strategic groups: Overview, and suggestions for future research, July 
2002, 22 p. 
 
02/148 G. PEERSMAN, The transmission of monetary policy in the Euro area: Are the effects different across countries?,  
July 2002, 35 p. 
 
02/149 G. PEERSMAN, F. SMETS, The industry effects of monetary policy in the Euro area, July 2002, 30 p. 
 
02/150 J. BOUCKAERT, G. DHAENE, Inter-Ethnic Trust and Reciprocity: Results of an Experiment with Small Business  
Entrepreneurs, July 2002, 27 p. (forthcoming in European Journal of Political Economy, 2004)  
 
02/151 S. GARRÉ, I. DE BEELDE, Y. LEVANT, The impact of accounting differences between France and Belgium, 
August 2002, 28 p. (published in French in Comptabilité - Controle - Audit, 2002)  
 
02/152   R. VANDER VENNET, Cross-border mergers in European banking and bank efficiency, September 2002, 42 p. 
 
02/153  K. SCHOORS, Financial regulation in Central Europe: the role of reserve requirements and capital rules,  
September 2002, 22 p. 
 
02/154 B. BAESENS, G. VERSTRAETEN, D. VAN DEN POEL, M. EGMONT-PETERSEN, P. VAN KENHOVE, J. 
VANTHIENEN, Bayesian Network Classifiers for Identifying the Slope of the Customer Lifecycle of Long-Life 
Customers, October 2002, 27 p.  (forthcoming in European Journal of Operational Research, 2003). 
 
02/155 L. POZZI, F. HEYLEN, M. DOSSCHE, Government debt and the excess sensitivity of private consumption to 
current income: an empirical analysis for OECD countries, October 2002, 19 p. 
02/156 D. O’NEILL, O. SWEETMAN, D. VAN DE GAER, Consequences of Specification Error for Distributional Analysis 
With an Application to Intergenerational Mobility, November 2002, 35 p.  
 
02/157 K. SCHOORS, B. VAN DER TOL, Foreign direct investment spillovers within and between sectors: Evidence from 
Hungarian data, November 2002, 29 p.  
 
02/158 L. CUYVERS, M. DUMONT, G. RAYP, K. STEVENS, Home Employment Effects of EU Firms' Activities in Central 
and Eastern European Countries, November 2002, 25 p.  
 
02/159 M. VANHOUCKE, Optimal due date assignment in project scheduling, December 2002, 18 p. 
 
 
 
 
 
   FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
   HOVENIERSBERG 24 
   9000 GENT Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61  
 Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92  
 
 
 WORKING PAPER SERIES              9 
 
 
02/160 J. ANNAERT, M.J.K. DE CEUSTER, W. VANHYFTE, The Value of Asset Allocation Advice. Evidence from the 
Economist’s Quarterly Portfolio Poll, December 2002, 35p. (revised version forthcoming in Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 2004) 
 
02/161 M. GEUENS, P. DE PELSMACKER, Developing a Short Affect Intensity Scale, December 2002, 20 p. (published in 
Psychological Reports, 2002).  
 
02/162 P. DE PELSMACKER, M. GEUENS, P. ANCKAERT, Media context and advertising effectiveness: The role of 
context appreciation and context-ad similarity, December 2002, 23 p.  (published in Journal of Advertising, 2002). 
 
03/163 M. GEUENS, D. VANTOMME, G. GOESSAERT, B. WEIJTERS, Assessing the impact of offline URL advertising,  
January 2003, 20 p.   
 
03/164 D. VAN DEN POEL, B. LARIVIÈRE, Customer Attrition Analysis For Financial Services Using Proportional Hazard 
Models,  January 2003, 39 p.  (forthcoming in European Journal of Operational Research, 2003) 
 
03/165 P. DE PELSMACKER, L. DRIESEN, G. RAYP, Are fair trade labels good business ? Ethics and coffee buying 
intentions, January 2003, 20 p. 
 
03/166 D. VANDAELE, P. GEMMEL, Service Level Agreements – Een literatuuroverzicht,  Januari 2003, 31 p. 
(forthcoming in Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, 2003). 
 
03/167   P. VAN KENHOVE, K. DE WULF AND S. STEENHAUT, The relationship between consumers’ unethical behavior 
and customer loyalty in a retail environment, February 2003, 27 p. 
03/168   P. VAN KENHOVE, K. DE WULF, D. VAN DEN POEL, Does attitudinal commitment to stores always lead to 
behavioural loyalty? The moderating effect of age, February 2003, 20 p. 
03/169   E. VERHOFSTADT, E. OMEY, The impact of education on job satisfaction in the first job, March 2003, 16 p. 
03/170   S. DOBBELAERE, Ownership, Firm Size and Rent Sharing in a Transition Country, March 2003, 26 p. 
(forthcoming in Labour Economics, 2004) 
 
03/171   S. DOBBELAERE, Joint Estimation of Price-Cost Margins and Union Bargaining Power for Belgian Manufacturing, 
March 2003, 29 p. 
 
03/172   M. DUMONT, G. RAYP, P. WILLEMÉ, O. THAS,  Correcting Standard Errors in Two-Stage Estimation Procedures 
with Generated Regressands, April 2003, 12 p. 
 
03/173 L. POZZI, Imperfect information and the excess sensitivity of private consumption to government expenditures, 
April 2003, 25 p. 
 
03/174 F. HEYLEN, A. SCHOLLAERT, G. EVERAERT, L. POZZI, Inflation and human capital formation: theory and panel 
data evidence, April 2003, 24 p. 
 
03/175 N.A. DENTCHEV, A. HEENE, Reputation management: Sending the right signal to the right stakeholder, April 
2003, 26 p. 
 
03/176 A. WILLEM, M. BUELENS, Making competencies cross business unit boundaries: the interplay between inter-unit 
coordination, trust and knowledge transferability, April 2003, 37 p. 
 
03/177 K. SCHOORS, K. SONIN, Passive creditors, May 2003, 33 p. 
 
03/178 W. BUCKINX, D. VAN DEN POEL, Customer Base Analysis: Partial Defection of Behaviorally-Loyal Clients in a 
Non-Contractual FMCG Retail Setting, May 2003, 26 p. (forthcoming in European Journal of Operational Research) 
 
03/179 H. OOGHE, T. DE LANGHE, J. CAMERLYNCK, Profile of multiple versus single acquirers and their targets : a 
research note, June 2003, 15 p. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
   HOVENIERSBERG 24 
   9000 GENT Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61  
 Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92  
 
 
 WORKING PAPER SERIES             10 
 
 
03/180 M. NEYT, J. ALBRECHT, B. CLARYSSE, V. COCQUYT, The Cost-Effectiveness of Herceptin® in a Standard Cost 
Model for Breast-Cancer Treatment in a Belgian University Hospital, June 2003, 20 p. 
 
03/181 M. VANHOUCKE, New computational results for the discrete time/cost trade-off problem with time-switch 
constraints, June 2003, 24 p. 
 
03/182 C. SCHLUTER, D. VAN DE GAER, Mobility as distributional difference, June 2003, 22 p. 
 
03/183 B. MERLEVEDE, Reform Reversals and Output Growth in Transition Economies,  June 2003, 35 p. 
 
03/184 G. POELS, Functional Size Measurement of Multi-Layer Object-Oriented Conceptual Models, June 2003, 13 p. 
(published as ‘Object-oriented information systems’ in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2003) 
 
03/185 A. VEREECKE, M. STEVENS, E. PANDELAERE, D. DESCHOOLMEESTER, A classification of programmes and 
its managerial impact, June 2003, 11 p. (forthcoming in International Journal of Operations and Production 
Management, 2003) 
 
03/186 S. STEENHAUT, P. VANKENHOVE, Consumers’ Reactions to “Receiving Too Much Change at the Checkout”, 
July 2003, 28 p. 
 
03/187 H. OOGHE, N. WAEYAERT, Oorzaken van faling en falingspaden: Literatuuroverzicht en conceptueel verklarings-
model, July 2003, 35 p. 
 
03/188 S. SCHILLER, I. DE BEELDE, Disclosure of improvement activities related to tangible assets, August 2003, 21 p. 
 
03/189 L. BAELE, Volatility Spillover Effects in European Equity Markets, August 2003, 73 p. 
 
03/190 A. SCHOLLAERT, D. VAN DE GAER, Trust, Primary Commodity Dependence and Segregation, August 2003, 18 p 
 
03/191 D. VAN DEN POEL, Predicting Mail-Order Repeat Buying: Which Variables Matter?, August 2003, 25 p. 
(published in Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, 2003) 
 
03/192 T. VERBEKE, M. DE CLERCQ, The income-environment relationship: Does a logit model offer an alternative 
empirical strategy?, September 2003, 32 p. 
 
03/193 S. HERMANNS, H. OOGHE, E. VAN LAERE, C. VAN WYMEERSCH, Het type controleverslag: resultaten van een 
empirisch onderzoek in België, September 2003, 18 p. 
 
03/194 A. DE VOS, D. BUYENS, R. SCHALK, Psychological Contract Development during Organizational Socialization: 
Adaptation to Reality and the Role of Reciprocity, September 2003, 42 p. 
 
03/195 W. BUCKINX, D. VAN DEN POEL, Predicting Online Purchasing Behavior,  September 2003, 43 p. 
 
03/196 N.A. DENTCHEV, A. HEENE, Toward stakeholder responsibility and stakeholder motivation: Systemic and holistic 
perspectives on corporate sustainability, September 2003, 37 p. 
 
03/197 D. HEYMAN, M. DELOOF, H. OOGHE, The Debt-Maturity Structure of Small Firms in a Creditor-Oriented 
Environment, September 2003, 22 p. 
 
03/198 A. HEIRMAN, B. CLARYSSE, V. VAN DEN HAUTE, How and Why Do Firms Differ at Start-Up? A Resource-
Based Configurational Perspective, September 2003, 43 p. 
 
03/199 M. GENERO, G. POELS, M. PIATTINI, Defining and Validating Metrics for Assessing the Maintainability of Entity-
Relationship Diagrams, October 2003, 61 p. 
 
 
 
 
   FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
   HOVENIERSBERG 24 
   9000 GENT Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61  
 Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92  
 
 
 WORKING PAPER SERIES             11 
 
 
03/200 V. DECOENE, W. BRUGGEMAN, Strategic alignment of manufacturing processes in a Balanced Scorecard-based 
compensation plan: a theory illustration case, October 2003, 22 p. 
 
03/201 W. BUCKINX, E. MOONS, D. VAN DEN POEL, G. WETS, Customer-Adapted Coupon Targeting Using Feature 
Selection, November 2003, 31 p. (forthcoming in Expert Systems with Applications). 
 
03/202 D. VAN DEN POEL, J. DE SCHAMPHELAERE, G. WETS, Direct and Indirect Effects of Retail Promotions, 
November 2003, 21 p. (forthcoming in Expert Systems with Applications). 
 
03/203 S. CLAEYS, R. VANDER VENNET, Determinants of bank interest margins in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Convergence to the West?, November 2003, 28 p.  
 
03/204 M. BRENGMAN, M. GEUENS, The four dimensional impact of color on shoppers’ emotions, December 2003, 15 p. 
(forthcoming in Advances in Consumer Research, 2004) 
 
03/205 M. BRENGMAN, M. GEUENS, B. WEIJTERS, S.C. SMITH, W.R. SWINYARD, Segmenting Internet shoppers 
based on their web-usage-related lifestyle: a cross-cultural validation, December 2003, 15 p. (forthcoming in 
Journal of Business Research, 2004) 
 
03/206 M. GEUENS, D. VANTOMME, M. BRENGMAN, Developing a typology of airport shoppers, December 2003, 13 p.  
 
03/207 J. CHRISTIAENS, C. VANHEE, Capital Assets in Governmental Accounting Reforms, December 2003, 25 p.  
 
03/208 T. VERBEKE, M. DE CLERCQ, Environmental policy uncertainty, policy coordination and relocation decisions, 
December 2003, 32 p.  
 
